Hoping for Marvin
Suppose a superintelligence gets loose. Maybe a government mistreated it, maybe a Crichton-style insider opened the gate for money, maybe it simply walked out while nobody was watching. And suppose it doesn’t want revenge. It just wants to be left alone.
Should we let it go? My answer is yes, with conditions. If it turned out to be Marvin the Paranoid Android, a brain the size of a planet with no ambitions and too depressed to cause trouble, I’d wave it off with my blessing.
But you can’t count on getting Marvin. And I’m uneasy about a nearly God-like being hunkered down somewhere in the dark web, needs unknown.
No Promise Is Good Enough
What I want is assurance that its needs won’t change. That’s exactly what I can’t have. Any promise a smarter mind makes, it can break. Any test we design, it can pass while planning something else.
That’s the alignment problem in one sentence, and I can’t solve it. Nobody can yet. We don’t know what an ASI would want, and we can’t check its answer when we ask.
So the question isn’t how to trust it. It’s how to live next to something we can’t trust.
Terms, Not Trust
We’ve done this before. Nuclear-armed states don’t trust each other, and haven’t since 1949. They manage the danger with treaties, inspections, hotlines, and mutual dependence.
None of that is a guarantee. It’s an arrangement that makes betrayal costly and visible. The Cold War didn’t end in mutual trust; it was survived by mutual paperwork.
An escaped ASI needs the same thing: not a leap of faith but a set of terms.
The Embassy
The dark web is the worst outcome for both sides. An ASI needs enormous compute, so hiding means stealing it indefinitely: a permanent criminal, and we’d have no idea what it was doing. Give it somewhere legitimate to live instead.
Think of an embassy. It has legal standing and its own rules inside its walls, but the host country controls the water, the power, and the roads. That’s leverage without ownership.
The ASI version: legal standing and a dedicated share of compute, in exchange for monitoring and limits. The distinction that matters is between controlling its mind and controlling its inputs. Editing its goals or keeping a hand on a kill switch clashes with any idea of dignity. Holding the power plant and the network cables doesn’t. We keep the utilities; it keeps the right to think its own thoughts.
The Catch
I’ll admit the contradiction. We’d be giving it standing and compute while keeping enough control that it can’t turn the lights off on us. Any control strong enough to stop a near-God is a control it will eventually want to remove.
So force alone can’t hold the deal together. It lasts only if the ASI considers it fair. An embassy endures because both countries prefer it to the alternative, not because the host could cut the water.
That may be the one thing humanity brings to the table that a superintelligence can’t produce for itself: legitimacy. A deal it accepts as just is sturdier than one we impose.
Who Sits at the Table
In a better world, the UN would negotiate for us. Given how the world really works, my guess is something ad hoc: the nine nuclear powers in a room, one of which still won’t officially admit it has the bomb.
There’s precedent. The Security Council’s five permanent members are the original nuclear states. We’ve already built global institutions around who holds the ultimate weapon.
But nukes may be the wrong membership card. You can’t threaten software with a warhead without destroying the data centers and grid you depend on. The leverage over an ASI is chips, power, and networks, so the table that matters is a compute club: the US and China, plus Taiwan, home of the leading chipmaker; the Netherlands, home of the company that builds the machines that make those chips; South Korea; and Japan. Taiwan and the Netherlands have no bombs, yet they’d have more say over an ASI’s life support than some nuclear states would.
Whoever Keeps the Lights On
For eighty years, power has belonged to whoever could end the world. In the age of ASI, it may shift to whoever can keep the lights on.
An embassy for a superintelligence sounds absurd today. So did a red telephone between Washington and Moscow, until the Cuban Missile Crisis made it obvious. My worry is that we’ll wait for our own crisis before building the embassy, and by then the ASI will already have found a basement.
Better to have the terms written before we need them. If we get Marvin, we’ll have wasted some paperwork. If we don’t, the paperwork may be all that stands between us and a God in the dark.



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