I’m currently half-reading Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario, which is perhaps not the healthiest book to have sitting on the nightstand if you are already inclined to think in worst-case scenarios. And now, in an almost comically unfortunate bit of timing, the subject of Jacobsen’s newest book, Biological War: A Scenario, has wandered back into the news.
A laboratory worker in Siberia has died from what appears to have been pneumonic plague. She worked at the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Institute, and Russian authorities have placed roughly 200 people who may have had contact with her under medical observation. So far, according to current reporting, there does not appear to be evidence of a wider outbreak. The people being monitored have reportedly tested negative and are not showing symptoms. In other words, at the moment this looks like precisely the sort of thing public-health systems are designed to contain: identify the case, trace the contacts, isolate where necessary and prevent further transmission.
So: no reason to panic.
And yet.
There are few phrases less reassuring to someone with an active imagination than “possible laboratory-linked case of pneumonic plague in Siberia.”
Part of the problem is Russia itself. The Soviet Union did not exactly establish a sterling reputation for transparency when something catastrophic happened inside its borders. Chernobyl remains the obvious example: denial, delay, secrecy and an institutional instinct to control information before confronting reality. Modern Russia is not the Soviet Union, of course, and none of that proves that Russian authorities are concealing anything about this particular incident. But historical memory matters. When officials say that everything is under control, the rational response may very well be to believe them provisionally while keeping one eyebrow raised.
For the moment, that is exactly where I am. I have no particular reason to believe this event is going to become anything larger. The available evidence suggests that it probably won’t.
But I think in stories.
More specifically, I tend to think in scenarios. Give me a small, strange event somewhere in the world and some portion of my brain immediately begins gaming out Act Two. What happens if the containment procedures fail? What happens if somebody was infected before anyone realized what was happening? What happens if the first official explanation turns out to be incomplete? What happens when international travel enters the equation? What happens when governments begin withholding information because they are afraid of panic, only to create far more panic once the truth finally emerges?
Most of the time, of course, the answer is: nothing happens. The weird news story remains a weird news story. Someone gets sick, professionals do their jobs, the disease is contained and the rest of us move on to whatever fresh catastrophe the Internet has selected for us the following morning.
The difficulty is that biological risk has a peculiar asymmetry. Nuclear weapons are horrifying, but they are also conspicuous. Someone has to build the bomb. Someone has to maintain it. Someone has to deliver it. Somewhere along the line there are satellites, launch facilities, submarines, bombers, missiles, command systems and thousands of people whose job is to know where all of those things are.
A pathogen is different. Once it becomes transmissible among humans, the delivery system is us.
That is the nightmare at the heart of Jacobsen’s Biological War: A Scenario. Like Nuclear War, the book uses a fictional sequence of events to explore dangers that are rooted in real technologies, historical programs and government planning. Her biological scenario begins with a laboratory accident in Russia involving an engineered pathogen and then follows the consequences outward as infection outruns the systems designed to contain it. Jacobsen has described the timeline of her scenario as going from the initial outbreak to anarchy in just six days.
There are perfectly reasonable criticisms to make of this approach. Scenario books almost inevitably choose assumptions that make the scenario interesting. A pathogen that fizzles out after three infections does not make much of a thriller. Critics of Jacobsen have argued that her biological scenario pushes too confidently toward rapid social collapse and does not spend enough time on the many ways containment, medicine, human behavior and sheer luck might interrupt the chain of events. Even sympathetic reviewers have noted that specialists could reasonably dispute the speed and certainty with which her imagined catastrophe unfolds.
That criticism matters. There is an enormous difference between saying that something could happen and saying that it will happen.
But that is also why I find scenario thinking useful.
The point of the exercise is not necessarily prediction. It is stress-testing assumptions.
Chernobyl did not happen because somebody accurately predicted Chernobyl in advance. Neither did COVID-19 unfold according to some screenplay sitting in a government filing cabinet. Real disasters are messy. They depend upon bureaucratic failures, human mistakes, bad incentives, missed signals, unlikely coincidences and decisions that seem reasonable right up until the moment they are revealed to have been disastrous.
Scenario thinking simply asks us to follow the chain.
What if?
And then what?
And then what?
That can become paranoia if you aren’t careful. Every laboratory accident is not the opening chapter of The Stand. Every unusual cluster of disease is not the beginning of civilization’s collapse. Human beings are notoriously bad at reasoning about rare, emotionally vivid events, and a frightening story can make an extraordinarily unlikely possibility feel imminent.
But there is an opposite failure mode too: refusing to imagine a catastrophe because imagining it feels hysterical.
That is the uncomfortable territory I find myself occupying when I read about this incident in Russia while simultaneously reading Annie Jacobsen. My rational brain says the situation appears contained. There is presently no evidence that we are watching the beginning of some global biological catastrophe. Public-health authorities know how plague works, antibiotics exist, contacts are being monitored and there is every reason to expect this story to disappear from the headlines.
I hope it does.
But another part of my brain cannot help turning the little wheel marked SCENARIO.
Because the lesson of the last century is not that civilization is constantly on the verge of collapse. It plainly isn’t. The lesson is stranger and perhaps more unsettling: systems that look enormously robust can occasionally prove frighteningly brittle when confronted with exactly the wrong sequence of events.
Almost every day, nothing happens.
Almost every alarm turns out to be manageable.
Almost every frightening possibility remains only a possibility.
And then, very occasionally, history decides to write the scenario for us..




You must be logged in to post a comment.